Abstract-This paper presents an empirically grounded model, which links organizational learning to pattern-specific fixed costs in integrated device manufacturing. The approach described in this paper helps fab managers make fundamental strategic decisions concerning product design and product mix by engaging in scenario planning. Four critical aspects of managing patternspecific fixed cost are analyzed in detail-sensitivity to time, design cost, and production volume; platform designs; process postponement solutions; and design penalties. The model suggests that designers and fabrication facilities must collaborate extensively on the design and realizations of product platforms for state-of-the-art integrated circuit products to remain economically viable.
I. INTRODUCTION
P ATTERN-SPECIFIC fixed costs, such as the cost of designing state-of-the-art circuits and the cost of fabricating advanced photomasks [1] , constrain the profitability of semiconductor manufacturing. Pattern-specific fixed costs are particularly difficult to amortize in designs that are realized at low volumes. Leading-edge chipmakers are thus under pressure to respectively design and realize a few 'best sellers' (state-of-the-art circuits that will sell at high volumes) rather than a plethora of low-volume designs.
Design costs and mask costs can vary by orders of magnitude. Both need to be amortized by producing chips, the more per design and per mask set, the better. The cost of developing a design platform for a system on a chip that spans multiple process technology nodes and generates a plethora of derivative designs can be in the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. The cost of generating photomasks is inversely proportional to pattern feature sizes. The cost of a mask set for a state-ofthe-art design to be realized by an advanced semiconductor process may exceed U.S. $10 million.
Pattern-specific fixed costs are rising relentlessly as integrated circuit feature sizes continue to shrink [1] - [7] . Leadingedge chipmakers consequently have an increasingly bigger incentive to manage the constraint on profitability that patternspecific fixed costs impose on their business. To do so, they need an empirically grounded theoretical framework that explains how pattern-specific fixed costs impact their bottom line. "Semiconductor manufacturers and SEMATECH have generated models that have attempted to address the fundamental strategic issues that semiconductor manufacturers face (e.g., [8] ). These models have successfully characterized the general economic environment in which semiconductor manufacturers find themselves" [9, p. 316] . However, these models do not completely describe how pattern-specific fixed costs affect the profitability of advanced semiconductor manufacturers.
This paper describes an empirical study, which addresses the abovementioned deficiencies. Preliminary findings of the study have been published in [10] . This paper presents new results, which incorporate data that were gathered in 2015. It also adds a theoretical foundation to prior research (e.g., [1] , [9] , and [10] ).
The primary contribution of the study described in this paper is an empirically grounded model of the cost and value of organizational learning (CoVaL), which can be applied to the business models of integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) in semiconductor manufacturing. "The model helps practicing managers make fundamental strategic decisions through scenario planning. It integrates well-known, subsystem-level organizational learning metrics (number of dice per wafer, fault density, line yield, fab throughput), environmental economic variables (average sales prices of the goods to be sold, quantity demanded) and internal metrics that estimate the cost of learning" [9, p. 316] . These inputs can be customized to reflect the specific conditions of particular IDMs. The model subsequently estimates the profitability of designs that are realized by the venture after product release. The CoVaL model described in this paper consequently allows managers to make fundamental strategic decisions pertaining to pattern-specific fixed costs. The model provides managers with a priori knowledge of how their decisions will impact the profitability of a particular circuit design or a product platform that gives rise to a group of related designs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the research methods deployed in the study that is described in this paper. Section III explains the empirically grounded CoVaL baseline model that emerged from the data. Section IV shows how individual parameters of this model are varied to generate scenarios that are of 0894-6507 c 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. particular interest to semiconductor manufacturers. Section V draws conclusions from the study. Section VI looks at applications of the study's results and identifies some of the challenges pertaining to pattern-specific fixed costs in integrated device manufacturing.
II. RESEARCH METHODS
The CoVaL approach was initially introduced to the semiconductor industry to characterize its key economic drivers [1] , [9] - [22] , which are scale, 1 scope 2 and speed. 3 It has since been refined [21] and exercised in a manner that helps semiconductor manufacturers manage Moore's Law [20] and capital productivity [9] , [25] . "CoVaL models differentiate themselves by incorporating value metrics [1] , [9] - [12] , [14] - [21] , [26] , and by their ability to span the complete investment horizon [26] of a semiconductor process lifecycle" [9, p. 316] . These features help managers of fabrication facilities (fabs) in IDMs estimate the true economic value of particular practices over time.
Empirical evidence for this paper comes from qualitative research methods from the social sciences [27] - [29] , which have been deployed successfully in prior studies conducted in the semiconductor industry [1] , [9] , [10] , [13] - [21] . Primary source data has been elicited in one-on-one interviews with 54 experts in semiconductor manufacturing and design that are employed by 26 chipmakers and supplier firms in the semiconductor industry. The interviews were conducted over a prolonged period of time (1996 through 2015), allowing the researchers to observe how semiconductor manufacturing practices have changed over the years. Data from case interviews have been compared to data from secondary sources. These include normalized data on the average sales prices of integrated circuits [8] , [16] and projections of technical trends that have been published in various editions of the Semiconductor Industry Association's International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) [30] . Primary source data was also supplemented by observing the behavior of the employees of a fab over a prolonged period of time [17] , [18] .
All data were subsequently analyzed and incorporated into a CoVal model, which simulates the profit potential of a variety of design and manufacturing practices through which the problem of pattern-specific fixed costs can be addressed. This CoVal model constitutes a baseline case, which represents a semiconductor venture that realizes only one IP pattern. Parameters of the CoVal model are varied to characterize the 1 Economies of scale refer to declines in unit costs of a product (or operation or function that goes into producing a product) as the absolute volume produced per period increases [23, p. 3] . A firm enjoys economies of scale when it is able to double its output at less than twice the cost [24, p. 223 ].
2 Economies of scope are present when the joint output of a single firm is greater than the output that could be achieved by two different firms each producing a single product (with equivalent production inputs allocated between the two firms) [24, p. 227] . Economies of scope are usually associated with managing product mix [18] . 3 By contrast, economies of speed in semiconductor manufacturing result from reducing fab cycle time [16] and from accelerating the yield learning rate [14] in an urgent economic environment.
patterning-specific fixed cost of scenarios that are of interest to foundries and fabless enterprises.
III. EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED FRAMEWORK

A. Physical Assumptions
Empirical evidence gathered in this study validates the findings of prior research [15] - [26] , [31] - [33] . Fabs tend to ramp their wafer start rate, W(t), up to volume production in a 'stair step' pattern. Evidently, "a fab learns from novel experiences as it increases its production volume in a linear manner [32] and that fab cycle time increases radically as production volume approaches fab capacity [16] - [18] , [20] , [21] " [9, p. 318] . The fab introduces a technology node into production at time t=0 ('node release'). It ramps up its new technology until capacity constraint eases [12] , [14] , [15] . According to respondents, this process takes about 2 years, but can transpire slightly more rapidly. The baseline model assumes that the wafer start rate rises in a stair-step pattern from 6000 wafers per quarter at t=0 to 25,000 wafers per quarter within 18 months of node release.
Our study has identified three subsystem-level, quality learning efforts -increasing survival yield, S(t); reducing fault density, F(t); and increasing the batch size, B(t) -all of which are common in the semiconductor industry [12] , [14] - [22] . All three learning variables behave in a manner that is consistent with Lotka-Volterra models, in which engineers and managers are treated as predators that prey on all "errors, wastes and other inefficiencies that impair operations of the [production] process" [31, p. 911] . Input from respondents suggests that performance is designed to a specific target at a particular time t=t * =3 years, when the semiconductor technology node reaches maturity. Under these circumstances, Lotka-Volterra equations take their finite form [31, p. 911], which (1), (2) , and (3) express for the quality learning variables in this study [9, p. 318] .
where S(t) denotes survival yield-the fraction of wafers in a production lot that survives production line-at time t; S(0) = S(t) at t=0; S(t * ) = S(t) at process maturity (t=t * =3 years); and k S represents decay constant for S(t).
Input from respondents suggests that the survival yield typically saturates at about 95% by the time of node release. Thus S(t) = S(t=0) = S(t * =3 years) = 0.95.
where F(t) denotes fault density in faults per wafer (fpw) at time t; F(0) = F(t) at t=0; F(t * ) = F(t) at process maturity (t=t * =3 years); and k F represents the decay constant for F(t). Consistent with input from respondents, F(0), F(t * ) and k F were set to 550 fpw, 14 fpw and 3, respectively.
where B(t) denotes batch size in number possibly realizable of dice per wafer (dpw) at time t; B(0) = B(t) at t=0; B(t * ) = B(t) at process maturity (t=t * =3 years); and k B represents the decay constant for B(t). Consistent with input from respondents, B(0), B(t * ) and k B were set to 275 dpw, 650 dpw and 1.8, respectively. However, batch size is increased in discrete increments by shrinking die size from design revision to design revision [17] , [19] , which, according to respondents and secondary sources (e.g., [8] and [16] ), take place on a schedule similar to what is suggested in Table I. "Reducing fault density and die size are highly leveraged efforts because die-sort yield is a highly nonlinear function of die size and fault density [34] " [9, p. 318] . For example, the quantity of chips supplied per unit time can be expressed in terms of (4), if one assumes a Poisson yield model.
Under capacity constraint, Q s (t) is less than or equal to the quantity demanded, because every chip that is produced will be sold. The stylized CoVal model in fig. 1 represents the physical assumptions for the baseline case in this study, a fab that produces very large-scale integrated (VLSI) circuits on wafers with a diameter of 300 millimeters and has one node already running in production mode. Fig. 1 reflects the outcome volume learning and the quality learning efforts described in (1) through (4) . It covers the first three years after 'node release' (t=0), the point in time at which the first product of particular technology node is released into production. All trajectories in fig. 1 are scaled for purposes of visual comparison. Fig. 2 illustrates the financial assumptions that underlie this study, which are also consistent with prior research. Like fig. 1 , it covers the time span from node release to maturity, 0 ≤ t ≤ 3 years. All trajectories in fig. 2 are drawn to scale for illustrative purposes. In particular, Q S (t) is deflated by 5 * 10 −7 , to demonstrate the timely revolutions in organizational performance that VLSI manufacturing organizations undergo during a yield ramp [12] , [14] .
B. Financial Assumptions
The average unit sales price of the integrated circuits to be sold, P(t+CT), decays exponentially from an initial value P(0) at t=0 until it approaches a floor of P min asymptotically [14] , [16] , [19] , [21] - [23] , [25] . CT denotes the average fab cycle time of the product under production, and k P represents the constant that determines the rate of decay.
The following values for parameters in (5) are consistent with how respondents describe the economic environment of a leading-edge integrated circuit manufacturer: P(0) = U.S. $500; P min = U.S. $5; CT= 50 days. Finally, k P = 0.5; thus P(t+CT) decays by a factor of 10 over a period of two years. The costs of integrated circuit manufacturing can be broken down into three categories: bulk wafer production, C BWP (t); design cost, C Des (t); and mask cost, C Mask (t). Most of these costs need to be amortized because they are primarily fixed. C BWP (t) is part of the baseline case. Mask cost and design cost are pattern specific. They are discussed in the next section.
When C Des (t) and C Mask (t) are excluded from cost calculations, a fab producing at time t generates a profit from bulk wafer production at an estimated rate of
where P(t+CT) Q S (t) represents the fab's revenue generation rate, R(t). Fig. 2 displays these variables on a per wafer basis. Under these circumstances,
BWP (t)/[W(t)S(t)] = P(t + CT)e −F(t)/B(t) B(t) − C BWP (t)/[W(t)S(t)]. (7)
According to the respondents, revenue per wafer increases from about U.S. $20,000 to U.S. $60,000 within a year of node release and deteriorates thereafter. Over the period of interest, bulk cost per wafer is much less than the revenue per wafer. Thus bulk profit per wafer tracks revenue per wafer quite well.
Respondents indicate that C BWP (t) per wafer is very high (∼$6000) shortly after node release, because ramping up a technology node to volume production constitutes the largest expenditure relatively few wafers produced in the first year of production [14] , [19] , [20] , [25] . However, according to the respondents, C BWP (t) per wafer can come down to $2000 within a year. The profit per unit product is at its highest level during the first two years after the release of a product line [14] , [19] , [25] , while P(t+CT) is still high. Finally, data show that profitability is higher for firms at the technological leading edge, whereas firms that run on very mature processes achieve a higher return on investment [9] .
IV. DEVELOPING SCENARIOS
After generating the baseline case in figs. 1 and 2, patternspecific fixed costs are added to the bulk costs, and key parameters are varied, ceteris paribus (one at a time), to develop cases, which explore phenomena that are important to foundries, fabless enterprise sand vertically integrated firms that design and fabricate their own ICs. Four phenomena are examined in detail: A) sensitivity to time, design cost and production volume; B) platform designs; C) process postponement; and D) design penalties. Fig. 3 illustrates how profitability varies as a function of design cost, production volume and time. The range for design cost spans two orders of magnitude, from U.S. $10 million to U.S. $1 billion. It is assumed that design cost is amortized over five years. Production volume also varies by two orders of magnitude, from 1000 wafers per year (wpy) to 100,000 wpy. This corresponds to a range of about 500,000 to 50 million good chips in the third year after node release. Mask cost (including multiple patterning) is kept constant at U.S. $10 million to reflect the state of affairs in early 2016. The cost of each mask set amortizes according to the schedule in table 2. Thus the first two mask sets of each design have to be amortized within a period of two quarters, the third and the fourth within four quarters. Fig. 3 displays nine scenarios, which reflect permutations of design cost and production volume that are an order of magnitude apart. All scenarios follow a similar pattern as time progresses. Profitability is low or negative near t=0, but it rises rapidly despite rapidly deteriorating ASPs. This low start and rapid rise comes from concurrent yield improvement, ramp to volume production and die shrinks that result from the introduction of design revisions. Profitability peaks around t=1 year, and decays thereafter, primarily due to an eroding unit ASP. The design shrinks manifest themselves in surges in profitability that occur at t=0.5 years and t=1.0 years, as well as in the postponement of the erosion of profitability at t=2.0 years. Fig. 3 illustrates that every semiconductor manufacturer has an incentive to produce 'best sellers', i.e., designs that sell on the order of 100,000 wafers worth of chips per year. Under these circumstances, mask costs do not really affect profitability in any significant way. Design costs of U.S. $100 million can be amortized effectively within about two months-design cost of U.S. $1 billion in about one year. If the production volume of a design is relatively low, say 1000 wpy, then the design cannot even be realized profitably for six months because the die sort yield and the production volume are too low, and mask cost matters very much. The total cost of the design and the mask cannot be recovered by t=1.7 years, the approximate time at which the effective market window of the design ends.
A. Design Cost, Production Volume and Time
B. Product Platforms and Derivatives
A product platform strategy is an approach to designing in which the designer initially invests heavily in a base architecture, in order to subsequently generate a plethora of derivative designs at low cost [35] , [36] .
The platform approach is particularly popular among makers of state-of-the-art integrated circuits who face short market windows and rapidly eroding unit prices (e.g., [8] ). For example, fig. 4 depicts the average sales price (ASP) of a series of derivative products that have been generated from a common platform. A new derivative is launched every six months. The ASP of each derivative drops by a factor of ten every six months after it hits the market. The ASP of each design at market release erodes from derivative to derivative in alignment with the baseline scenario from figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 5 displays the expected profit per wafer for the derivative designs in fig. 4 , when they are realized under the baseline conditions of figs. 1 and 2. The total design cost for the platform is $100M; the cost per mask set = $10M; and production volume = 2500 wafers per quarter. The design cost of the derivative is less than $1 million. Once again, profitability depends on time. A derivative that is released at t=0, makes no significant profit. Profitability rises as die-sort yield and wafer output rate increase. Profitability begins to erode as the technology node ages.
C. Process Postponement
"The key to mass customizing effectively is postponing the task of differentiating a product for a specific customer until the last possible point in the supply network" [37, p. 116] . "In process postponement, a generic part is created in the initial stages of the manufacturing process. In the later stages, this generic part is customized to create the finished product" [38, p. 65 ]. This approach allows semiconductor manufacturers to forecast and build to the aggregate demand for all products of a particular platform. Wafers are stored at an inventory point late in the fabrication process. Wafers are drawn from this inventory point and built to order to realize particular derivative designs. As a result, the chipmaker dramatically reduces the number of wafer inventories for the derivative designs in favor of one platform-specific inventory. This approach decreases the number of ICs that are at risk of being produced unnecessarily due to an erroneous demand forecast. The chipmaker also reduces the expenditures for photomasks by realizing the front end of the process from a single mask set. Customization, which requires one reticle set per derivative design, occurs at higher levels of interconnect. Fig. 6 illustrates the additional profit that can be realized from using postponement solutions under the baseline conditions from figs. 1 and 2. Total design cost = U.S. $100 million, but the cost per mask set is reduced to U.S. $2 million, due to the assumption that only a fraction of the masks of each derivative design need to be fabricated, and those that do are not the most expensive ones. Fig. 6 shows that the gain per wafer is most pronounced for low volume designs, where postponement can make the difference as to whether a design is economically viable or not. The impact of postponement is most pronounced shortly after node release, when the IDM fabricates larger chips.
D. Design Penalties
Platform designs and postponement are associated with a penalty, which results from optimizing the platform rather than each derivative. For example, some derivative designs may carry circuitry that is a feature of the architecture, but not essential to the particular derivative. This circuitry may even be disabled, yet it still takes up space on the chip. Die size is larger than necessary, causing each wafer to act as a batch for fewer chips than it maximally could.
Designing chips with suboptimal densities has economic consequences. For example, fig. 7 illustrates how designs that are larger than optimal reduce profitability, and that the loss of profitability is a function of time since node release. It displays the economics of a system on a chip that cost $100 million to design, runs on a mask set that cost $10 million to fabricate, and is realized at a rate of 2500 wafers per quarter. Shortly after node release, the design penalty is severe because die sizes tend to be large anyway, batch yields are low, and the fab is still ramping up to volume production. Under these conditions of capacity constraint [16] , [17] , the price of chip real estate is very high. Capacity constraint eases as the fab ramps up, die-sort yield improves and design revisions with smaller die sizes enter the fab at t=1 year. The design penalty decreases to manageable levels. For example, at t=2 years, a design that is 10% larger than the optimal target drops the profitability of its production under the abovementioned conditions by about 12%. A design that is 40% larger than optimal induces a profit loss of less than 40%. The design penalty increases as profitability erodes along with a deteriorating ASP.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an empirically grounded model, which links organizational learning to pattern-specific fixed costs. The approach described in this paper is based on the real-life experiences of practicing managers and well-known principles of semiconductor manufacturing. Thus it can help fab managers make fundamental strategic decisions concerning product design and product mix by engaging in scenario planning. Four critical aspects of managing pattern-specific fixed cost have been analyzed in detail -sensitivity to time, design cost and production volume; platform designs; process postponement; and design penalties.
The CoVal model that has emerged from the data leads to some potentially important conclusions about how economic constraints impact the profitability of integrated device manufacturers. Design costs, mask costs, production volume and the time since node release all constrain profitability. Their relative impact is case specific; it has to be determined by scenario analysis. The model must also be validated multiple fabs before it is ready for deployment in industry.
The time since node release turns out to have a big impact on profitability. During the ramp to volume production, die-sort-yield and the wafer output rate are still low. Thus the profit per wafer of integrated circuit products that are realized shortly after node release is low despite a high ASP. Profitability is highest around t=1 year; it deteriorates thereafter due to an eroding ASP. This principle appears overarching-it holds for unique build-to-order designs; for derivatives of platform designs; and for process postponement solutions. Even design penalties exhibit this inverted U-shaped pattern.
Design costs in excess of U.S. $100 million are becoming the norm. They are increasing the pressure on IDMs to deploy the platform approach. To amortize such expensive designs at a cost of $10 per chip, an IDM must sell on the order of 10 million units. However, 'killer apps' that lead to such production volumes are increasingly difficult to find. Finding applications for a family of 10 products, which are derived from one base architecture and yield an average of 1 million units each, is much easier.
Design costs can be amortized by the taking the platform approach, but mask costs cannot. Thus, for a derivative design to be profitable, a minimum volume of chips has to be realized for that design. While individual situations may vary, figs. 4 and 5 imply that even derivative designs need to be best sellers. A state-of-the-art design, whose total demand does not exceed an amount that can be supplied by 1000 highly yielding wafers, may not be economically viable. Mask costs are the limiting factor.
According to our respondents, process postponement solutions are primarily deployed in cases where the base design contains a very large and expensive memory component that needs to be customized on short notice. Very complicated designs are not well suited for postponement solutions because the nature of the customizations may not be understood at the time the base architecture has to be completed. The costs of revisiting the base architecture tend to outweigh the benefits of process postponement. Thus postponement frequently is not worth the risk.
As for design penalties, interviews with respondents suggest that time trumps space. Makers of systems on a chip adopt platform strategies in which all features are designed into the base architecture and are subsequently enabled from derivative to derivative as the market demands. The design penalty for this practice is fairly large; fewer chips fit onto a wafer. However, die-sort yield is not impacted significantly, because disabled circuits are not part of the critical area of the chip. If they contain a defect, the circuit still functions. The disabled area can be enabled upon demand without a major design revision, which would be expensive from the point of view of design cost and especially design time. In an environment of eroding ASPs, a design iteration that takes weeks may cause a severe loss of revenue. Most fabless design firms would prefer to get fewer chips out earlier. In the words of a senior engineer at a company that designs systems on a chip:
"If we can get the chips out two months earlier, then we will gladly take a 20% hit on design size. For circuits made with a 14−nanometer process, design size is no big deal."
The business models for modern integrated device manufacturing are significantly more complex than those of the traditional method of fabricating application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). In the ASIC business, tasks were clearly partitioned [39] . The manufacturer could provide the designers with a user toolkit and a set of design rules [40] . If the designer followed the rules, then the circuit should function when it is realized by the manufacturers. Designers did not have to understand the manufacturing process. They could engage in a rapid trial-and-error process that yielded one functioning design after another [40] .
The product platform strategies that characterize the modern IDM business break the task partition between the manufacturers and the designers. Designers are reluctant to make significant changes to their base architecture, and modern fabs realize a multitude of derivative designs from a variety of platforms on a plethora of manufacturing processes. Thus, experts within the fab have to understand some of the intricacies of the base architecture, and designers can no longer treat the fab as a black box. Transferring knowledge of that kind requires extensive socialization between experts, including a significant amount of face-to-face time [41] . Thus the designers and the fabs are required to collaborate in depth.
Unfortunately, the economic constraints on leading-edge chipmakers are likely to increase as integrated circuit feature sizes continue to shrink. Mask costs have been escalating relentlessly [1] - [7] , as increasingly expensive lithography tools print more complex patterns with ever smaller features. The opportunity to design complex circuits rises with the greater feature density that these technological advances enable. In response, semiconductor manufacturers have to develop parsimonious product strategies to meet these challenges. CoVal models for scenario planning, such as the one used in this study, are likely to become increasingly important in these endeavors.
